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the California Department of Health Ser-
vices (DHS). [14:1 CRLR 165] OMBC is
required to adopt the DHS guidelines and
ensure that its licensees are notified that
knowing failureto follow themconstitutes
grounds for disciplinary action. Although
OMBC had previously approved a motion
directing the preparation of infection con-
trol guidelines, the Board's fiscal crisis
has prevented action.
Also at the July meeting, OMBC elected
public member Ronald Kaldor to serve as
President, Richard Bond, DO, to serve as
Vice-President, and Laurie Woll, DO to
serve as Secretary/Treasurer.
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T he California Public Utilities Com-
mission (PUC) was created in 1911 to
regulate privately-owned utilities and en-
sure reasonable rates and service for the
public. Today, under the Public Utilities
Act of 1951, Public Utilities Code section
201 et seq., the PUC regulates the service
and rates of more than 43,000 privately-
owned utilities and transportation compa-
nies. These include gas, electric, local and
long distance telephone, radio-telephone,
water, steam heat utilities and sewer com-
panies; railroads, buses, trucks, and ves-
sels transporting freight or passengers;
and wharfingers, carloaders, and pipeline
operators. The Commission does not reg-
ulate city- or district-owned utilities or
mutual water companies.
It is the duty of the Commission to see
that the public receives adequate service
at rates which are fair and reasonable, both
to customers and the utilities. Overseeing
this effort are five commissioners ap-
pointed by the Governor with Senate ap-
proval. The commissioners serve stag-
gered six-year terms. The PUC's regula-
tions are codified in Chapter 1, Title 20 of
the California Code of Regulations (CCR).
The PUC consists of several organiza-
tional units with specialized roles and re-
sponsibilities. A few of the central divi-
sions are: the Advisory and Compliance
Division, which implements the Commis-
sion's decisions, monitors compliance
with the Commission's orders, and ad-
vises the PUC on utility matters; the Divi-
sion of Ratepayer Advocates (DRA),
charged with representing the long-term
interests of all utility ratepayers; and the
Division of Strategic Planning, which ex-
amines changes in the regulatory environ-
ment and helps the Commission plan fu-
ture policy. In February 1989, the Com-
mission created a new unified Safety Di-
vision. This division consolidated all of
the safety functions previously handled in
other divisions and put them under one
umbrella. The Safety Division is con-
cerned with the safety of the utilities, rail-
way transports, and intrastate railway sys-
tems.
Members of the Commission include
Daniel Win. Fessler, President, Patricia M.
Eckert, Norman D. Shumway, P. Gregory
Conlon, and Jessie J. Knight, Jr.
U MAJOR PROJECTS
Public Comment on the PUC's Pro-
posed Restructuring of California's
Electric Services Industry. In April
1994, the PUC outlined a major proposal
to alter its method of regulating electric
utilities. [14:2&3 CRLR 215; 14:1 CRLR
170] The proposed new approach isolates
for close regulation the necessarily mo-
nopolistic transmission of electricity (e.g.,
through power lines and transformers),
and deregulates power generation. The
proposal is based on the theory that, with
the advent of smaller and varied types of
generators able to produce competitively
priced electricity and the transferability of
electricity over greater distances, genera-
tion is not necessarily a "natural monop-
oly," but can be separated out for compe-
tition-which could enhance efficiency
and lower costs. The PUC has argued that
cheaper power going to other states is one
reason California consumers pay rates
which are 50% higher than the United
States average.
Two elements of the proposed plan
involve, respectively, "retail wheeling"
and "performance-based ratesetting." Re-
tail wheeling allows the consumer to buy
power from alternative power genera-
tors-the local utility, an out-of-town util-
ity, a power broker, or an independent
producer. The selected supplier would de-
liver the electricity to the local utility, and
the local utility would distribute or "wheel"
it to the customer or business through the
existing network of power lines. The local
utility would receive a fee for delivering
the power, while the supplier would re-
ceive a larger fee for generation costs.
Local utilities which do not offer a com-
petitive price for power generation would
become little more than the transportation
link in the power chain. This option,
dubbed by the PUC "direct access," would
be available to consumers according to the
following timetable:
-Large industrial consumers could be-
come direct access consumers on January
1, 1996.
-Commercial consumers receiving
service at the primary level could become
direct access consumers on January 1,
1997.
-Commercial consumers receiving
service at the secondary level could be-
come direct access consumers on January
1, 1998.
-All commercial consumers could be-
come direct access consumers after Janu-
ary 1, 1999.
-All remaining consumers could be-
come direct access consumers after Janu-
ary 1, 2002. Alternatively, consumers may
continue to receive electricity service
from their local utility in the traditional
manner, with prices regulated by the PUC.
The second part of the Commission's
plan would implement performance-
based ratesetting (PBR). PBR allows the
utilities' rates to be set according to an
average market price for electricity. If the
utility is able to generate or purchase elec-
tricity for less than the benchmark price,
the savings are split between the ratepay-
ers and the utility's stockholders. This ap-
proach eliminates the current ratesetting
system which examines the utility's costs
item by item and sets rates to allow the
utility a reasonable profit. Under PBR, if
the utility does not become more efficient,
the losses are split between ratepayers and
stockholders as well. The system is in-
tended to provide an incentive for the util-
ities to streamline their operations and in-
crease their efficiency. Under the Com-
mission's proposal, utilities would be al-
lowed to collect the costs of past unecono-
mic generating assets developed under the
old regulatory framework from both direct
access and traditional consumers. Cur-
rently, three of the major electricity utili-
ties in California have submitted propos-
als for PBR, and the Commission recently
approved an extension of the two-year
trial PBR program for San Diego Gas &
Electric Company (see below).
Since its April 20 introduction of the
proposal, the Commission has been hold-
ing public hearings and inviting comment
on the precedent-setting plan. The state's
two major utility consumer groups-San
Diego-based Utility Consumers' Action
Network (UCAN) and San Francisco-
based Toward Utility Rate Normalization
(TURN)-submitted comments or testi-
fied at the hearings. Both organizations
predicted discrimination against residen-
tial ratepayers who have the fewest alter-
native options. UCAN and TURN contend
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that where some customers have compet-
itive alternatives and others do not, pro-
ducers exploit those with no choice to gain
competitive advantage with those being
courted by others. Where energy provid-
ers have high fixed costs and must operate
at full capacity, the large industrial power
users are likely to get the benefit of mar-
ginal cost pricing-very low prices just
over the out-of-pocket cost of fuel or other
generation means.
In other words, the consumer groups
argued that it would be irrational for pro-
ducers not to price at a marginal cost level
for industrial and then commercial cus-
tomers as each is phased into competitive
choice. Until choice is allowed, the utility
has a captive consumer, but as each group
is phased in and allowed to choose a non-
utility power source competing with util-
ity power sources, that consumer will be
lost to the utility if its price cannot be
matched. Where a utility is operating an
oil, nuclear, hydro or other plant at close
to full capacity, any reduction in volume
means that the same overhead costs must
be paid by the smaller group of customers
remaining, meaning higher unit costs and
higher rates. The only way to maintain
efficiencies for the benefit of all ratepay-
ers is to lower prices to retain those cus-
tomers able to leave-down to the actual
marginal (out-of-pocket) cost of burning
the fuel or otherwise providing the power.
This means that the group last in line-
residential consumers-will bear most of
the overhead and other fixed costs as the
process unwinds.
Further, if marginal cost pricing fails
or is disallowed by the Commission, and
a utility powerplant loses so many large
customers it is "uneconomic," the remain-
ing captive ratepayers may have to pay the
cost of maintaining a plant operating at
low utilization, or bail out the utility by
amortizing and paying the costs of aban-
doning an uneconomic plant. TURN has
asked the PUC to reject "retail wheeling"
unless it can demonstrate that it will serve
the interests of small business and residen-
tial ratepayers. Alternatively, TURN pro-
poses to foster competition at the whole-
sale level, requiring the monopoly utilities
to buy electricity at the lowest available
price from independent power producers
rather than expanding their own plants.
Under this alternative scenario, competi-
tive power would be phased in as current
plants age and as increased population and
use creates new demand; the savings
achieved would be passed onto all rate-
payers, not merely those placed first in
line and advantageously presented with
the momentous bargaining power that al-
ternative choices create.
On June 14 and 15, the Commission
held two days of hearings on the plan at
the Los Angeles Convention Center, fo-
cusing on its likely effects on low-income
assistance programs, economic develop-
ment programs, low-emission vehicle pro-
grams, fuel diversity, demand-side man-
agement, energy conservation, and renew-
able resources. The listed topics involve
areas of current or possible regulatory
"cross-subsidy," where rates are designed
to provide socially beneficial incentives.
Critics at the hearings argued that, in some
cases, as with energy conservation and
renewable resources, cross-subsidies may
correct serious free market flaws-for ex-
ample, the external long-range costs im-
plicit in the exhaustion of nonrenewable
resources. Where the revised system es-
chews cross-subsidies in favor of straight
efficiency and lowest costs, it does not
calculate the fact that the market's lowest
cost may not be the true cost; there are
costs the producers may be passing onto
future generations which an imperfect
marketplace will fail to assess or ade-
quately ameliorate.
Utilities are currently required by reg-
ulation to obtain a percentage of their elec-
tricity from alternative sources which are
more environmentally friendly than tradi-
tional fossil fuel-based sources, including
a new generation of natural gas turbine
generators which promise high cost-effi-
ciency. Such alternative sources tradition-
ally carry higher generation costs in the
open market, resulting in less energy
being generated through renewable, pol-
lution-free, environmentally preferable
methods where the market and legal sys-
tems fail to assess producers the total and
long run costs their production methods
impose on others. Environmental critics
have rejected one Commission alternative
as a public relations distraction: allowing
consumers to check a box on their electric-
ity bill saying that they want their energy
generated by alternative sources. A mar-
ket-based alternative suggested by envi-
ronmentalists would assess a tax or cost to
each method of production based on the
additional and currently unassessed costs
each imposes on the environment or on
future generations; they argued that such
a solution allows the market to allocate
resources efficiently, while correcting for
its external cost avoidance flaw.
Environmentalists and labor groups
expressed additional concerns that some
of the cheaper power available through
deregulation will come from producers in
other states with minimal environmental
standards and which burn nonrenewable
resources, resulting in increased pollution.
Utilities countered that substantial energy
in California comes from oil-generated
sources, and additional emissions in non-
California locations is more benign than
in populous California, with its automo-
bile exhaust and atmospheric inversion
layer problems.
On June 15, the Commission released
a letter from U.S. Energy Secretary Hazel
R. O'Leary, who questioned the Commis-
sion's ability to unilaterally implement its
far-reaching plan given the jurisdiction of
federal regulators. Under the 1992 Energy
Policy Act, the Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission (FERC) has jurisdiction over
wholesale transmission rates, while the
PUC has jurisdiction over retail rates. The
authority problem is raised directly by the
PUC plan, as advantageous wheeling
would appear to involve FERC jurisdic-
tion and it is unclear who has jurisdiction
over "retail wheeling." Susan Tierney, as-
sistant secretary for domestic and interna-
tional energy policy with the Department
of Energy, buttressed O'Leary's letter
with testimony at the June 15 hearing,
describing the plan as "a high-risk legal
position for California." Commission staff
contended that the plan was not offered as
"an order" because of the need to cooper-
ate and coordinate with many actors, in-
cluding the federal jurisdiction.
The Commission held additional full-
panel hearings throughout the summer
and fall of 1994, including hearings on
July 1 in Sacramento, August 4 in San
Francisco (focusing on wholesale electric
markets), and September 7 in San Diego.
Interested parties appearing at the hear-
ings have included representatives of Pa-
cific Gas & Electric Company (PG&E),
Southern California Edison (SCE), San
Diego Gas & Electric Company (SDG&E),
and the Consumer Alliance for Electricity
Rate Reductions (CAERR), a disparate
group including TURN, UCAN, the Cali-
fornia Large Energy Users Association,
and the Agricultural Energy Consumers
Association. Two additional and import-
ant consumer organizations weighed in on
the PUC's plan during the late summer:
Consumer Action, a San Francisco con-
sumer organization, and Consumers First,
a coalition of California ratepayers started
by Jim Conran, former Manager for Con-
sumer Affairs and Public Issues at Pacific
Bell and subsequently Director of the state
Department of Consumer Affairs. On Au-
gust 31, they held a joint forum in San
Diego to brief consumer organizations on
the issues prior to the Commission's Sep-
tember 7 San Diego hearing.
At the hearings, PG&E argued for a
further delay of six years, until 2008, to
phase in residential consumers, and prom-
ised in return that the ratepayers would not
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have to pay for the transition costs of
uneconomic past investments (such as the
Diablo Canyon Nuclear Powerplant), and
that rates would not be increased for retail
customers. SDG&E argued for a more mod-
est delay (until 2005), and for the creation
of a competitive wholesale power-genera-
tion market, including a wholesale pool of
resources.
CAERR argued that the utilities' pro-
posed extensions would mean an addi-
tional six years where residential consum-
ers are likely to bear disproportionately
high rates given their lack of choice and
the economic facts discussed above, and
that if costs decline under the plan, resi-
dential ratepayers should be paying less,
not paying the same amount to dis-
proportionately cover utility fixed costs
while industry and commercial users pay
much less. Further, CAERR argued that
by standing last in line, residential con-
sumers-who already lack the bargaining
power of large industrial users-would
find advantageous terms foreclosed and
be left with the producers rejected by the
large users.
CAERR released a report prepared by
Economic Sciences Corporation (ESC),
an independent consulting firm, which
compares operating costs of California's
utilities to 100 comparable utility compa-
nies in other states. ESC's report con-
cluded that California consumers paid
$6.4 billion more in 1992 than the average
rate of the other 100 utilities. CAERR
called upon all California utilities to cut
electric rates by 25% by 2000. In response,
the utilities contended that California's
high rates are the result of excessive reg-
ulation, and the inability to use cheap coal-
fired generators.
SCE argued that retail competition
should be postponed indefinitely. The util-
ity proposed the creation of an indepen-
dent energy purchasing company (called
"POOLCO") which would buy from all
comers-utilities and independents-to
stimulate the wholesale market for energy.
The CAERR group of energy consum-
ers does not appear to oppose the concept
of applying competition to energy produc-
tion and purchase; its focus appears to be
on the details which it contends favor the
utilities and industrial users. CAERR ob-
jects particularly to the abandonment of
conservation incentives for free market
principles of maximum consumption, the
undermining of various extant cross-sub-
sidies for low-income people, and such
add-ons as a "competition transition charge"
applied to users of retail wheeling to com-
pensate utilities for their displacement
costs and likely to inhibit or even preclude
cost savings. CAERR also argues that the
price design which distinguishes what the
plan terms "direct access" customers
(those able to contract and wheel) from
"utility service" customers (residential
and other customers dependent upon the
utility) favors further the large users.
CAERR's message is that the Commis-
sion, in a frenzy to obtain the political
support of (or to neutralize) the utilities
and industry, is prepared to give them the
brunt of the system's gain.
Commission staff contend privately
that the system's gain is sufficient to af-
ford advantage to all, and that if powerful
interests receive a disproportionate bene-
fit in the short run, in the process they have
surrendered significant monopoly power-
henceforward subject to marketplace effi-
ciencies and discipline. The Commission's
argument is that add-on cross-subsidies,
conservation, and external cost assess-
ment are not precluded where strong reg-
ulatory presence remains and the distribu-
tion system remains subject to regulation.
Perhaps a short-run reward goes to the
utilities who will suffer extraordinary dis-
placement cost and risks, others do not
affirmatively lose in the bargain, and all
will gain substantially once competition is
established over the long run.
In addition to the utilities, environmen-
tal and consumer groups, major power
users, and the federal government, the pas-
sage of ACR 143 (Sher) (Chapter 148,
Resolutions of 1994) portends the Califor-
nia legislature's entry into the electric de-
regulation debate. ACR 143 creates the
Joint Oversight Committee on Lowering
Electricity Costs, to be chaired by respected
Assemblymember Byron Sher. The Com-
mittee may develop legislation which could
facilitate-or impede-the Commission's
proposed deregulation plan, and which will
specifically examine performance-based
ratemaking, direct access to markets in
other states (and federal law conflicts),
and proposed transition surcharges and
their allocation among classes of custom-
ers. The Committee will report on the "fi-
nancial status" of the utilities, and submit
options for funding low-income ratepayer
assistance, fuel diversity, conservation,
women- and minority-owned business op-
portunity, low-emission vehicle develop-
ment, and environmental protection pro-
grams (see LEGISLATION).
The Commission has countered by
scheduling an expanded series of "public
participation" hearings in San Jose on
September 20, Fresno on September 26,
Pasadena on September 27, Bakersfield
on November 1, Ventura on November 2,
Garden Grove on November 2, Carson on
November 3, San Bernardino on Novem-
ber 9, and Huntington Park on November
19. Thus far, the agenda for these exten-
sive proceedings does not appear to in-
volve consideration of a proposed "order"
or "rule" or any other vehicle capable of
legal effect. It appears that the arrange-
ment of such an order requires coordina-
tion with the legislature-where numer-
ous existing statutory provisions are im-
plicated-and with the federal govern-
ment. No action is expected until early
1995, but the PUC plan's concept remains
quite alive.
Performance-Based Ratesetting Ex-
tended by Commission for SDG&E. On
August 3, the PUC adopted a rate decision
proposed by Administrative Law Judge
Mark Wetzell. The adoption is particularly
significant as a precedential exercise of the
Commission's new "performance-based
ratesetting" approach. [14:2&3 CRLR 216]
As noted above, PBR establishes a target
market price and then allows the utility to
keep a portion of the savings if its costs
decline, or requires it to accept less if its
costs are higher; in both cases, the differ-
ence is shared between the stockholders
owning the utility and ratepayers. The
concept is to replicate the natural market-
place, which rewards efficiency gain and
punishes inefficiency.
SDG&E, a strong supporter of PBR,
had previously won a two-year pilot proj-
ect to set performance-based rates in 1993;
the current proceeding sought to refine
and extend the rates until 1999. It should
be noted that the electric power generation
deregulation proposal discussed above is
independent of performance-based rate-
setting; it would be just as feasible (and,
consumer advocates argue, more judi-
cious) to maintain traditional fair rate of
return maximum rate regulation to the mo-
nopoly power distribution system. But the
Commission has joined the two concepts
politically, and the adoption of the alterna-
tive and allegedly more market-like new
ratesetting system constitutes another step
in the PUC's new policy direction.
UCAN, the major proponent of con-
sumers at the rate hearing to extend
SDG&E's PBR pilot project, argued that
SDG&E had rigged the target and indica-
tors to assure excessive profits for its
stockholders. UCAN contended that sub-
stantial efficiency gain would be achieved
from the mere increase in usage due to
population gain within a high fixed cost
plant, and that stockholder enrichment be-
yond a fair rate of return was being sought
from this and other factors unrelated to
improved performance. UCAN argued
that the utility had already received a
$57.4 million rate increase in the first PBR
proceeding in 1993. and that the pending
SDG&E rate request would add 4-5% per
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year until 1999, accomplishing a largely
unjustified $250 million in additional
profits to the utility.
ALJ Wetzell's proposed decision was
announced on July 1, and was agreed to
by the U.S. Navy (SDG&E's utility's larg-
est customer) and by the PUC's Division
of Ratepayer Advocates. Notwithstanding
vigorous legal and public dissent by
UCAN, it was adopted without significant
alteration by the full Commission on Au-
gust 3. The final decision allows earnings
greater than 1% above SDG&E's author-
ized rate of return to be shared equally
between shareholders and ratepayers.
Earnings greater than 3% above the au-
thorized rate of return will trigger PUC
rate review. If earnings fall upto 3% below
the authorized rate of return, the share-
holders absorb the deficiency; a return
lower than that level would trigger a rate
review for possible rate increases. Under
traditional rate of return analysis, a mo-
nopoly must also bear deficiencies below
authorized rates of return (and may seek
rate increases), but-unlike the perfor-
mance-based alternative-if there is profit
beyond the authorized level, the utility
does not keep it; rates are reexamined and
lowered to benefit ratepayers. Utilities are
rewarded for improved performance by
conferring rate of return increases, and by
allowing them to retain efficiency-gener-
ated increases during the year earned.
Joined by TURN, UCAN condemned
the decision as a windfall for the utility
and an abdication of the Commission's
responsibility to ratepayers who are sub-
ject to monopoly power. UCAN's Michael
Shames argued that energy bills could in-
crease well over the $5 increase antici-
pated in each monthly bill by 1998; he
argued that the approved rates will allow
SDG&E to raise rates by as much as $312
million and boost profits by 25%, and
without necessarily achieving any effi-
ciencies from its own devices. The utility
applauded the decision, describing it as
the most comprehensive experiment in the
nation in performance-based ratemaking.
SDG&E's Tom Page contended that the
utility could achieve $19 million more, or
$21 million less, than its target rate of
return and that the outcome would depend
upon its cost control success and perfor-
mance in employee safety, customer satis-
faction, system reliability, and rate com-
parison.
Biennial Resource Plan Update: Bid
Awards Announced. On June 22, the
PUC announced that the state's indepen-
dent power industry would be allowed to
supply electricity to California consum-
ers. The Biennial Resource Plan Update
(BRPU) was first proposed in 1986 as a
means of adding alternative energy to the
utility power grid. The allowance of
cogeneration from sources outside the utility
is not new, but has ebbed and flowed as
varying oil and nuclear costs, and litigation
by the utilities, has affected its viability. The
BRPU was designed to examine whether
independent companies using new technol-
ogy could compete with California's private
utility power generation.
The Commission announced winning
bids from private independent power pro-
ducers, including wind, geothenral, hydro,
biomass and waste (landfill gas) sources.
The average winning bid amounted to 33%
less than utility alternatives. Advocates for
alternative and renewable energy argue
that renewable energy may be more com-
petitive than is widely believed, and the
bids suggest that substantial benefits can
accrue from competitive opportunities. In-
terestingly, the winner of the largest con-
tract was a joint venture between PG&E
and the Bechtel Corporation (U.S. Gener-
ating Company) which will build a gas-
fired power plant to sell 712 megawatts
(MW) of power. Supporters of the BRPU
process, including TURN and the Califor-
nia Manufacturers Association, noted that
the PUC's acceptance of independently
provided power will add 500 MW of re-
newable energy capacity and will save
ratepayers $260 million annually.
Prior to the June 22 announcement,
those promoting independent power pro-
duction and alternative energy sources
had complained bitterly that the Commis-
sion had abandoned the BRPU experi-
ment. The award turned bitter commen-
tary in the affected trade press to effusive
congratulatory prose for the PUC. The
results appear to provide substantial sup-
port for at least the electric deregulation
concept advanced by the Commission.
PUC Authorizes IntraLATA Com-
petition, Higher Basic Rates. On July 20,
the PUC issued for public comment a new
proposed decision which raises the basic
monthly rate for telephone service from
$8.35 to $11.25 for Pacific Bell custom-
ers, and from $9.75 to $17.25 for GTE
California customers; decreases interLATA
(local toll calls of between 16 and 70 miles
within each of the state's eleven local
phone service areas) rates by as much as
40%; and allows long distance carriers
such as AT&T, MCI, and Sprint to com-
pete with PacBell and GTE in the intra-
LATA category of service. The PUC is-
sued a similar order in 1993, but rescinded
that decision less than three weeks later
after it was revealed that a top-level Pa-
cific Bell official helped write and edit the
draft decision on the evening before its
announcement, and engaged in unre-
ported ex pare communications with a
decisionmaker in violation of PUC rules
of procedure. [14:1 CRLR 166; 13:4 CRLR
203]
On September 15, the PUC adopted the
proposed decision, which is viewed by
many as being most beneficial to busi-
nesses and least beneficial to elderly, low-
income, and minority customers: accord-
ing to the PUC's estimates, 50% of monthly
residential bills will rise by $0.42 or more.
Also, long distance carriers, as well as
consumer groups such as TURN, criti-
cized the way in which consumers must
access the competing carriers for intra-
LATA service; to use a phone company
other than their basic service carrier for
local toll calls, customers will have to dial
a special five-digit access code. Critics
contend that Pacific Bell will have a built-
in advantage over its competitors unless
customers can use any carrier without hav-
ing to dial additional numbers; the PUC is
expected to conduct further research into
this "equal access" issue in future months.
The PUC's decision will take effect on
January 1, 1995.
PUC Initiates Proceedings to Stream-
line Regulations Governing Non-Mo-
nopoly Telephone Service Providers.
On February 3, the PUC instituted a joint
rulemaking and investigative proceeding
which would streamline regulations gov-
erning many telecommunications service
providers in California. The proceedings
center around a comprehensive revision of
the regulatory requirements for so-called
"nondominant" telephone corporations,
defined by the PUC as those which do not
possess the ability to harm consumers
through the exercise of market power.
This class of service providers does not
include AT&T, the dominant long distance
company, monopoly local exchange carri-
ers (LECs) such as Pacific Bell and GTE
California, or cellular companies. The gist
of the revision would allow nondominant
telephone providers (NDTP) to avoid the
complex certification and tariff approval
process with a registration procedure,
which might be as simple as a one-page
form to be filed with the Commission. To
provide consumer safeguards, each busi-
ness utilizing the registration process must
agree to be bound by the PUC's applicable
consumer protection standards, as well as
those of other state or local consumer pro-
tection agencies. Furthermore, the busi-
ness must agree to enforcement of these
standards in the appropriate jurisdiction,
such as the small claims court in the locale
of the customer. [14:2&3 CRLR 216; 14:1
CRLR 168-69]
On July 13, staff presented the PUC
with a report entitled Consuner Protec-
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tions for Consumers of Non-Dominant
Telecommunications Providers: A Staff
Report to Commissioners, which contains
a comprehensive evaluation of the current
consumer protection systems available to
consumers of the services of NDTPs sub-
ject to the PUC's proposed order. Among
other things, the report provides an over-
view of the current consumer protection
system; reviews regulatory models which
may be applicable to NDTP issues; pro-
poses a model consumer protection sys-
tem aimed at addressing the changing con-
ditions of a competitive marketplace; dis-
cusses consumer rights and responsibili-
ties; and makes recommendations for an
effective consumer protection system.
The report indicates that the PUC needs to
ensure that the following elements are
made available to all NDTP consumers:
• Consumers must have accurate and
understandable information necessary to
make informed decisions about telecom-
munications services.
- Consumers contacting the Commis-
sion must receive a timely and knowledge-
able response that outlines their options.
• Consumers' informal complaints must
receive an initial investigative response
from the PUC; Commission resources
must be adequate to conduct further inves-
tigations when warranted.
- Consumers must have a progressive
range of complaint resolution options, in-
cluding alternative dispute resolution pro-
cedures.
- Consumers must be encouraged to
participate in PUC proceedings and pro-
vided the support necessary to do so.
* Commissioners and relevant staff
must be aware of consumer concerns,
problems, and opinions.
Acknowledging that such wide-sweep-
ing reform is not within its authority under
existing law, the Commission sought
amendments to the Public Utilities Code
which would authorize it to waive the
certification and tariffing requirements for
registration of nondominant telephone
corporations. AB 3767 (Andal) would
have permitted the Commission to apply
"registration only" regulation to telephone
corporations without monopoly or signif-
icant market power; however, this bill died
in committee (see LEGISLATION). Be-
cause of the bill's failure, the Commission
may consider implementing alternative
legal procedures in the interim.
PUC Files Petition to Avoid Federal
Preemption of Cellular Regulation. On
December 17, 1993, the PUC opened an
investigation of the mobile telephone ser-
vice industry to develop a comprehensive
regulatory framework designed to pro-
mote an orderly transition into a fully
competitive marketplace while assuring
that consumers are protected against un-
just or unreasonable rates. [13:4 CRLR
205] On August 3, the PUC issued an
interim opinion in which it considered the
threshold question of whether current
market conditions for mobile telephone
services protect subscribers adequately
from unjust, unreasonable, or discrimina-
tory rates, and consequently, whether con-
tinued state regulation of carriers is neces-
sary to protect consumers. In its opinion,
the PUC concluded that the wholesale cel-
lular telephone market currently remains
uncompetitive, and that, "[a]ccordingly,
state regulation of cellular carriers should
continue at least for the near term to pro-
tect consumers against unreasonable rates
while fostering the development of a com-
petitive mobile telecommunications mar-
ket."
In its opinion, the PUC explained that
significant change in federal regulation of
mobile service providers was initiated
with the passage of the federal Omnibus
Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, which
amends section 332 of the Federal Com-
munications Act of 1934 to create a new
regulatory framework governing "com-
mercial mobile radio service." On March
7, the Federal Communications Commis-
sion (FCC) issued its "Second Report and
Order" addressing the implementation of
the 1993 Budget Act; as stated in the FCC
order, the intent of the Budget Act was to
replace traditional regulation of mobile
services with a comprehensive, consistent
framework. The Budget Act also preempts
state and local rate and entry regulation of
all commercial mobile radio services ef-
fective August 10, 1994; however, any
state with rate regulation in effect on June
1, 1993, may petition the FCC by August
10, 1994, to extend that authority based on
a showing that industry market conditions
fail to protect subscribers from unjust
rates, or that such service is substantially
a replacement for landline exchange ser-
vice.
Accordingly, the PUC solicited evi-
dence in its investigation on the degree of
competition currently existing in urban,
suburban, and rural California markets for
commercial mobile services; whether, in
each market, competitive conditions pro-
tect subscribers adequately from unjust
and unreasonable rates, or rates that are
unjustly discriminatory for commercial
mobile services; and where such market
conditions exist, whether commercial mo-
bile service is a replacement for landline
telephone exchange service for a substan-
tial portion of the telephone landline ex-
change service within California markets.
Based upon the results of its investigation,
the PUC concluded that "the cellular sec-
tor of the mobile services market contin-
ues to be uncompetitive which has perpet-
uated unreasonably high rates." Accord-
ingly, the PUC decided to exercise its op-
tion under federal law to file a petition to
retain regulatory authority over cellular
carriers for an interim period of eighteen
months after September 1, 1994. In its
opinion, the PUC added that it is the
Commission's "expectation that the in-
dustry would have come under effective
competitive discipline by the end of this
period." However, at present, most mar-
kets have-at most-two competitors.
Large cellular carriers enjoying dispensa-
tion from both rate regulation and compe-
tition have aggressively sought federally
granted insulation from state or local reg-
ulation, similar to the privileges exercised
by the cable television industry. 19:4
CRLR 91
PUC's Allocation of Pacific Telesis
Spin-Off Refund Under Challenge. In
January 1994, ALJ Greggory Wheatland
asked for written comments from inter-
ested parties on the proposed disposition
of the $49 million fund established to
compensate ratepayers for the spin-off of
Pacific Telesis' wireless operations. Tele-
sis was required to establish the fund as
one condition of the PUC's approval of the
spin-off, to compensate ratepayers for re-
search and development costs of wireless
and cellular systems financed through
phone rates between 1974 and 1983. In its
spin-off decision, the PUC identified sev-
eral alternative methods of allocating the
funds, including the funding of advanced
telecommunications for schools and li-
braries or for rural or economically under-
developed areas; reinstating the Telecom-
munications Education Trust (TET) to
fund programs to inform the public about
telecommunications services and pro-
grams; funding outreach to inform quali-
fied consumers about low-cost phone ser-
vice through the Universal Lifeline pro-
gram; and flowing the refund through to
ratepayers in the form of reduced phone
rates. [14:2&3 CRLR 217; 14:1 CRLR
167; 13:4 CRLR 2041
On August 8, the PUC announced that
$7.9 million of the now $50 million fund
will be refunded directly to Pacific Bell
ratepayers on a pro rata basis through a
surcredit on monthly bills; $40 million
will be used for telecommunications pro-
grams and facilities in public schools
statewide; and $2.1 million will be used to
continue the TET. According to Commis-
sioner P. Gregory Conlon, funding tele-
communications infrastructure for schools
is appropriate because it is an effective
way to stimulate the development of an
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advanced telecommunications infrastruc-
ture for California, and benefits California's
telecommunications users. In conjunction
with its decision, the PUC extended the
term of the TET program until December
31, 1996.
PUC Commissioners Patricia Eckert
and Norman Shumway opposed this allo-
cation of the $50 million fund; in her
dissent, Eckert opined that "the $50.3 mil-
lion must all be refunded to Pacific Bell's
ratepayers under California law." Accord-
ing to Eckert, "refunding all of the monies
to Pacific Bell's current ratepayers is the
option most clearly supported by Califor-
nia law and Commission practices." Among
other things, Eckert expressed concern
that the allocation to the schools has the
attributes of a tax, which the Commission
has no authority to impose; Eckert was
also critical of the plan's redistribution of
money from one service territory to an-
other franchise territory, stating that Pa-
cific Bell's former ratepayers will presum-
ably end up funding schools statewide,
including those in GTE California's and
the other local exchange companies' terri-
tory.
TURN and the legislature, through As-
sembly Speaker Willie Brown, have both
filed petitions for rehearing with the Com-
mission which are pending at this writing.
If denied, as anticipated, both may be ex-
pected to petition for California Supreme
Court for review. In the filed briefs seek-
ing rehearing, TURN argues that any as-
sessed funds should be returned to rate-
payers. The legislature argues that any
funds not returned to ratepayers must be
deposited in the general fund. The challenge
here presented will turn on the authority of
the PUC to give restitution to ratepayers
directly-that is, through what are called cv
pres grants. Substantial authority supports
such an equitable option for courts (State of
California v. Levi Strauss & Co., 41 Cal.
3d 460 (1986)), particularly where direct
restitution to all victims is impractical and
one of the goals of restitution is disgorge-
ment of the defendant's "unjust enrich-
ment." There is also authority that the
PUC exercises all of the equitable powers
of a court in its adjudicatory capacity
(Consumers Lobby Against Monopolies v.
PUC, 25 Cal. 3d 891 (1979)). The Com-
mission is also likely to cite the powers
delegated to it in Article XII, sections 2, 5,
and 6 of the State Constitution, and sec-
tions 701, 734-36 of the Public Utilities
Code, which give the Commission broad
authority, including authority over "repa-
ration" collection and awards.
PUC Overturns AL's Discovery
Order. On April 1, PUC ALJ Robert L.
Ramsey ordered the California Cable
Television Association (CCTA) to comply
with discovery requests filed by Pacific
Bell, which would require CCTA to dis-
close member information concerning de-
ployment of fiber optic cable and inten-
tions to provide telecommunications ser-
vices which would compete directly with
local exchange carriers such as Pacific
Bell. CCTA, a professional association
comprised of over 350 California cable
system operators, opposed the discovery
requests on the grounds that the informa-
tion is irrelevant to the underlying pro-
ceeding, is privileged, and consists of ma-
terials which the association does not
maintain and cannot legally be compelled
to gather from its membership. CCTA ap-
pealed the decision to the full Commis-
sion. 114:2&3 CRLR 217]
On June 24, ALJ John S. Wong stayed
ALJ Ramsey's April I ruling until the
Commission could address the merits of
CCTA's appeal. According to Wong, the
discovery dispute in this proceeding "in-
volves the extent to which a trade associa-
tion's membership is subject to discovery
when only the trade association is a party
to a Commission proceeding." Noting the
"potential impact of this issue in other
Commission proceedings," Wong opined
that "this is an issue that should be re-
solved by the Commission in advance of
any decision on the merits of the petition
for modification...."
On August 3, the PUC issued its deci-
sion resolving CCTA's appeal; initially,
the PUC noted that its decision is a "rare
occurrence" in that the Commission is
normally reluctant to review evidentiary
and procedural rulings before the proceed-
ing has been submitted. However, the
PUC decided to review the appeal in this
proceeding because of the possible rami-
fications the ruling could have in other
proceedings where an association is a
party.
In determining whether-in the con-
text of a discovery order-it may compel
an association to provide answers from its
members, the PUC noted that Public Util-
ities Code section 1794 provides that
"[t]he Commission or any Commissioner
or any party may, in any investigation or
hearing before the Commission, cause the
deposition of witnesses residing within or
without the state to be taken in the manner
prescribed by law for like depositions in
civil actions in the superior courts of this
state and to that end may compel the atten-
dance of witnesses and the production of
books, waybills, documents, papers, and
accounts." The PUC then noted that the
discovery procedures available in civil
courts depend on the relationship or status
of the person from whom discovery is
sought; for a party to a proceeding, a wide
range of discovery procedures are avail-
able (e.g., interrogatories, requests for ad-
mission, document production), while dis-
covery of one who is not a party to the
action is somewhat more limited (e.g.,
depositions with or without a subpoena
duces tecum).
Pacific Bell and GTEC argued that
CCTA's participation in this proceeding is
analogous to a class action suit, in which
members of the represented class are sub-
ject to discovery. However, the PUC con-
cluded that class actions are distinguish-
able from an association's participation in
proceedings before it, stating that "[tihe
most distinguishing factor is that in a class
action, the class suit is brought so that the
class representative and the class mem-
bers can obtain a share of the damages, or
of a common fund...." However, in a PUC
proceeding, "an association and its mem-
bers are not awarded any damages. In-
stead, associations participate in Commis-
sion proceedings because the rules or reg-
ulations at issue in a proceeding may im-
pact the financial relationship between the
utility and the association's members."
The PUC concluded that members of an
association should not automatically be
subject to discovery as a party merely
because they are members of an associa-
tion. This judgment rejects Pacific Bell's
argument, notwithstanding substantial
precedential support, that an association is
not a separate entity but a joint activity of
its membership taken in concert, existing
only to serve individual interests, and war-
ranting heightened scrutiny (not privacy
dispensation) because of the power of a
combination.
The PUC noted that ALJ Ramsey's
ruling requires "each member of CCTA"
to provide answers to certain discovery
requests, and "conclude[d] that the Com-
mission cannot compel an association to
require its individual members to answer
data requests." According to the PUC, one
of the principal purposes of discovery is
to enable the discovering party to obtain
evidence from one's adversary who has
control of the information in question, and
"[i]f information is being sought from in-
dividual members, it is unlikely that the
association possesses or has control over
that sort of information." However, the
PUC also held that to the extent that ALJ
Ramsey's ruling requires responses by
CCTA itself, the Commission will require
CCTA to provide answers to those re-
quests. Consumer advocates are critical of
this ruling, contending that it encourages
powerful associations to act as buffers,
impeding information disclosure for in-
formed decisions.
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The PUC also addressed CCTA's con-
tention that the information sought by one
of the requested items seeks information
protected by the attorney-client privilege
because it is seeking communications be-
tween CCTA members and its attorneys
concerning their individual positions on
CCTA's intervention in the instant case.
The PUC noted that the request in ques-
tion seeks the identity of those CCTA
members who have authorized or re-
frained from authorizing CCTA from act-
ing in this proceeding. According to the
PUC, this request "merely seeks to iden-
tify the clients on whose behalf CCTA is
acting, a matter which is not privileged as
was noted in ALJ Ramsey's ruling." The
PUC concluded that "[tlhe disclosure of
who CCTA is acting on behalf of will not
result in the disclosure of any of those
member's communications" and "does
not impinge on any communication made
in confidence in connection with the attor-
ney-client privilege."
FCC Promulgates Rules for Inter-
state Caller ID. On April 18, the FCC
established regulations for interstate Cal-
ler ID; the rules are scheduled to become
effective on April 12, 1995, and will pre-
empt state law only with regard to calls
made between states. Because the federal
standards are less restrictive than current
California Caller ID regulations, the PUC
is faced with the prospect of either forcing
the telephone service providers to develop
two sets of standards or modifying its reg-
ulations to conform to the federal model.
114:2&3 CRLR 218]
The new regulations, which will ap-
pear as 47 C.F.R. Part 64.1600-64.1604,
provide that any common carrier using the
SS7 switching technology must transmit
the calling party's number with all inter-
state calls (SS7 is the technology that
makes Caller ID service possible). The
rules further provide that all common car-
riers must provide a free per-call blocking
option for all such calls. There is no pro-
vision for per-line blocking. All common
carriers must use the code *67, dialed as
the first three digits of the call, as the
per-call blocking code (described by the
FCC as the caller's "request for privacy").
The receiving carrier must, with specified
exceptions, ensure that calls blocked in
this fashion are not disclosed. No common
carrier may charge any customer for the
call-blocking service. Finally, any com-
mon carrier using SS7 technology must
notify all customers that their phone num-
bers may be identified to a called party,
and inform customers how to maintain
privacy by using the *67 function.
The FCC rules differ from those devel-
oped by the PUC in 1992 [13:1 CRLR
135] in that the PUC ordered telephone
companies to offer three free blocking op-
tions: per-call blocking, per-line blocking,
and per-line blocking with per-call en-
abling. Per-line blocking is viewed as es-
sential for customers with unlisted phone
numbers who wish to keep their numbers
private. However, the FCC declined to
require a per-line blocking option because
of a concern that, in emergencies, a caller
would forget to disable the blocking and
prevent emergency response teams from
quickly identifying the caller. The PUC
also requires companies to establish an
extensive customer notification and edu-
cation program. To date, no major tele-
phone corporation in California has elected
to provide Caller ID service.
During the summer, over fifty petitions
for reconsideration were filed with the
FCC from state attorneys general, associ-
ations, public interest groups, and carriers.
Additionally, the PUC petitioned the U.S.
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals to overturn
the FCC's rulemaking order, on the basis
that it was reached in a manner that vio-
lates the procedural requirements pre-
scribed by the federal Administrative Pro-
cedure Act; however, the PUC later re-
quested that the court delay action on its
petition pending the outcome of the recon-
sideration petitions. At this writing, the
FCC has taken no official action in re-
sponse to the petitions; the PUC is ex-
pected to pursue its court action if the
reconsideration petitions are not resolved
to its satisfaction.
Pacific Telesis Strikes Alliance with
Key Minority and Consumer Group.
On July 14, Pacific Telesis and Pacific Bell
signed an agreement with the Greenlining
Coalition, which was formed to protect
minorities from "redlining" practices of
banks, insurance companies, and other
businesses; under the agreement, the two
groups will work together to bring tele-
phone service to more Californians. Spe-
cifically, Pacific Bell will consider im-
plementing a multilingual marketing plan
for Universal Lifeline Telephone Service;
developing and marketing products and
services that will enable customers to bet-
ter control their phone bills; and offering
a "warm" or "quick" dial tone service, so
that even if phone service has not been
ordered, a "warm" or "quick" dial tone
would allow an occupant to plug in his/her
phone to call Pacific Bell's business office
to make phone service arrangements or to
call 911 in emergencies.
New Federal Law Interrupts PUC
Review of General Freight Transporta-
tion Regulation. On August 23, President
Clinton signed H.R. 2739 (Oberstar), fed-
eral legislation which generally preempts
state regulation of the price, route, or ser-
vice of motor carriers transporting prop-
erty and air carriers transporting property
by motor vehicle. Generally, the federal
law, known as Public Law No. 103-305,
deregulates the transportation of general
freight; cement; livestock; rock, sand, and
gravel (by dump truck); motor vehicles in
secondary truckaway movement; trailer
coaches, campers, and recreational vehi-
cles; agricultural products; commodities
carried in tank trucks and vacuum tank
trucks; and transportation currently ex-
empt from California rate regulations. The
law also applies to private carriers and
integrated intermodal small package (IISP)
carriers.
However, the new law, which takes
effect on January 1, 1995, does not affect
the states' authority to license and regulate
the safety and financial responsibility of
these carriers, nor does it preempt the
states from regulating any aspect of the
transportation of household goods. Ac-
cordingly, a state may still impose high-
way route controls, limitations based on
the size and weight of the motor vehicle,
controls on hazardous cargo, minimum
insurance requirements, and self-insur-
ance authorization. Also, states may con-
tinue to regulate uniform cargo liability
rules, uniform bills of lading or receipts
for property being transported, uniform
cargo credit rules, antitrust immunity for
joint line rates or routs, and classifications
and mileage guides, provided that the
states' laws, regulations, or provisions are
no more burdensome than compliance
with the federal statutory provisions or
regulations adopted by the Interstate
Commerce Commission under the statu-
tory provisions.
The "deregulation-regulation" strug-
gle over trucking does not involve direct
health and safety regulation, where both
federal and state regulators have had and
retain substantial authority. The dispute
pertains to pricing: Carriers contend that
they should be licensed narrowly by type
of carriage and area, and competitors
barred unless current carriers are unable to
carry the volume offered; that they should
be allowed to meet together by type of
carrier and region and collectively and
privately propose rates (rate bureaus); and
that the PUC should review those rates for
fairness and enforce them as minimum
rates. The carriers have argued since the
1930s that these restrictions and minimum
rates are needed to prevent "destructive
competition," predatory pricing, inade-
quate investment in safety, excessive driv-
ing hours, and lack of stable carriage for
shippers. Consumer advocates, market
conservatives, and economists combined
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to condemn the restrictions and minimum
prices as horizontal price fixing in an in-
dustry particularly amenable to competi-
tion. Substantial studies conducted over
the past twenty years have generally fa-
vored the latter position, documenting
substantial waste (empty backhauls), ex-
cessive prices, inefficiency, and little cor-
relation between rates and safety or other
social benefits; much of this evidence has
been presented to the Commission over
the past decade. [11:3 CRLR 192; 10:4
CRLR 180-81; 6:1 CRLR 7]
The PUC replicated the much-criti-
cized federal system of trucking regula-
tion until the 1970s when deregulation
policies began to take hold nationally. The
PUC then followed the federal lead in
deregulation until 1980. It then curiously
began an eight-year period of "re-regula-
tion," permitting most of the practices re-
jected federally, with then-Commissioner
Gravelle strongly dissenting. Since 1988,
the PUC has once again considered a shift
back toward deregulation, but economists
and consumer advocates contend that it
retains significant anticompetitive fea-
tures.
The PUC has separated out different
classes of carriers throughout its history
for disparate regulatory treatment-com-
mon carriers (those who hold themselves
out generally for carriage) and contract
carriers (those who haul for a particular
shipper or shipper group). Common carri-
ers are subject to greater regulation. The
PUC has separated out common carriers
traditionally by type, e.g., household
goods, livestock, logging, dump trucks,
cement haulers, petroleum, and "general
freight." General freight, as the largest
category, no longer has the once intrusive
limitations on type of truck, commodities
allowed to be carried, entry, and prices
which may not be varied. However, the
system in place allows rate bureaus to
continue, and rates must be filed before
they can be charged, with at least ten days'
advance notice allowed. The PUC has re-
duced its role as the enforcer of minimum
rates, but economists and consumer advo-
cates argue that where the PUC allows
collusion and requires advance notice of
any rate decrease, it creates what they call
"an advance detection mechanism" for
those in a combination to enforce its
terms. The result is likely to be the same.
The PUC has allegedly turned from the
enforcer of private rate-fixing to a passive
but tolerant facilitator. Meanwhile, other
critics contend that the tariffs have be-
come so complex that experts must be
hired to interpret them.
Complicating matters further, the PUC
created a new class of general freight com-
mon carrier, effective January 1, 1994-
the llSPCarrier. [14:2&3 CRLR 218; 13:4
CRLR 210-11] IISP carriers are those car-
rying small packages (under 150 pounds)
who also have an intermodal (air/ground)
transport capacity, such as Federal Ex-
press. This class is exempt from price reg-
ulation in the true sense, as intended from
federal trucking deregulation. There are
no rate bureaus, antitrust law fully applies,
rates need not be filed prior to charge, and
there are no minimum rates (except for the
unfair and predatory competition stan-
dards applicable to all). Knowing that al-
most half of general freight truck carriage
involves small packages, the carriers with-
out airplane capacity complained that they
were being undercut in price. They had to
file and wait ten days to meet a lower price
which a IISP carrier could quote over the
phone. Accordingly, AB 2015 (Moore)
(Chapter 1226, Statutes of 1993) required
the PUC to examine the impact of the new
truly deregulated class of carrier on those
subject to remaining regulation. In 1.94-
03-036, the Commission started such an
inquiry. Now, because of the federal leg-
islation, the PUC proceeding is in doubt;
currently, the PUC is examining the new
federal law to determine its effect on PUC
regulations and whether this rulemaking
proceeding is necessary.
If the federal statute operates to end
"rate bureaus," voluntary collusion, and
required tariff filing, it will mean substan-
tial change for most categories of Califor-
nia trucking, and the devolution of all
trucking to the open status of the new lISP
carrier. Such a required devolution is
clearly what the federal legislation intends
and appears to require. The one exception
in the federal law for household goods
carriers is significant: California retains
substantial anticompetitive regulation of
household goods carriage, including high
minimum rates based on $40 to $50 per
hour wages to loaders and drivers.
Rules on Disqualification of ALJs.
On August 3, the PUC adopted Rule 63.1
et seq., Article 16, Title 20 of the CCR,
which sets forth procedures governing the
disqualification of its ALJs for bias or
prejudice. t14:2&3 CRLR 218] The rules
set forth the grounds which qualify for
ALJ disqualification, grounds which do
not qualify for disqualification, and the
procedures for disqualifying an ALJ,
which may be accomplished by the ALJ or
upon the motion of any party.
During the 45-day public comment pe-
riod, comments were submitted by TURN
and PG&E; according to the PUC, these
comments largely restated arguments re-
garding an ALJ's knowledge of disputed
facts, peremptory challenges, and the ex
parte rule which were previously consid-
ered in the revised rules. Although TURN
favored a rule that would disqualify an
ALJ if he/she has personal knowledge,
acquired in a capacity other than that of an
AL, of disputed evidentiary facts con-
ceming the proceeding, the PUC rejected
this recommendation because it would
disqualify an ALJ if he/she acquired
knowledge of the disputed facts as a for-
mer member of the PUC staff. Many staff
members are promoted to ALJ after ac-
quiring technical knowledge of many is-
sues and, therefore, many ALJs would
have some knowledge of the disputed
facts.
Various groups favored affording par-
ties a peremptory challenge which would
allow for automatic disqualification of a
judge on the filing of an affidavit alleging
a good faith belief that ajudge is biased or
prejudiced-analogous to common court
procedure. The proposed rules initially did
not include peremptory challenges and
PG&E was one of five parties supporting
the inclusion of such a procedure; PG&E
suggested that peremptory challenges at
least be adopted for complaint cases and
preferably for "quasi-legislative" pro-
ceedings as well.
The PUC agreed to allow such a
challenge in adjudicatory "complaint"
proceedings.
The rules also include a ban on exparte
communications regarding the assign-
ment, reassignment, or disqualification of
a particular ALJ; PG&E did not favor this
ban, contending that exparte communica-
tions regarding disqualification should be
subject to the Commission's existing
rules. However, the PUC prudently de-
cided that it is important to prohibit ex
parte communications on the subject of
who is to hear or decide a case in order to
maintain the integrity of the decisionmak-
ing process, and will apply the prohibition
accordingly.
U LEGISLATION
ACR 143 (Sher), as amended August
27, 1994, expresses concern that the Com-
mission has not developed a sufficient fac-
tual record in its proceeding to deregulate
the electric services industry (see MAJOR
PROJECTS), and urges the PUC to issue
no interim, final, or effective order until it
has held evidentiary hearings and made
specified reports to the legislature and the
Governor. These reports include the fol-
lowing:
-proposed policies regarding perfor-
mance-based ratemaking and electric in-
dustry restructuring proceedings, includ-
ing a definition of the base revenue re-
quirements providing the starting point for
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measuring utility performance and achiev-
ing rate reductions, and policies providing
customer choice and fair generation com-
petition;
-a report on how those policies, in-
cluding policies affecting direct access
and reciprocity of service opportunity in
other states and countries, conflict with
state or federal law, and suggestions on
how to resolve those conflicts;
-a quantification, following eviden-
tiary hearings, on the competition transi-
tion surcharges for each utility and the
allocation of those charges among share-
holders, classes of ratepayers, and direct
access and utility service customers;
-an identification and quantification of
options, both through rates and through
alternative funding arrangements, to pay
for low-income ratepayer assistance, eco-
nomic development, fuel diversity and re-
newable resource development, demand-
side management, environmental protec-
tion, low-emission vehicle development,
and women- and minority-owned busi-
ness programs; and
-a report on how those policies and
programs affect existing investment in
nonutility electric power generation and
the climate for new investment in that
generation.
ACR 143 further establishes the Joint
Oversight Committee on Lowering the
Cost of Electric Services, consisting of at
least three and not more than five members
appointment by the Assembly Speaker, and
at least three and not more than five mem-
bers of appointed by the Senate Rules
Committee, to ensure that the proposals
made by the PUC meet the criteria out-
lined in ACR 143; ensure that the legisla-
ture is properly consulted and involved in
policies proposed by the Commission to
deregulate the electric services industry;
and provide a mechanism for the legisla-
ture to work with the Governor, the Com-
mission, the California Energy Commis-
sion, and other parties on the most effec-
tive strategy for achieving lower utility
rates, fair competition, improved environ-
mental protection, and resource diversity.
SB 1630 (Hart), as amended June 21,
requires local telephone corporations in
the state, excluding wireless or cellular
corporations, to provide, to the extent per-
mitted by existing technology or facilities,
all existing and newly installed telephone
connections to residential households
with access to "911" emergency service
regardless of whether an account has been
established, and prohibits telephone cor-
porations from terminating access to these
services for nonpayment of any delin-
quent account or indebtedness owed by
the subscriber to the telephone corpora-
tion. This bill was signed by the Governor
on September 15 (Chapter 612, Statutes of
1994).
SB 1709 (Peace). Existing law pro-
vides that whenever a public utility and a
cable television corporation or association
of cable television corporations are unable
to agree upon the terms, conditions, or
annual compensation for pole attachments
or the terms, conditions, or costs of rear-
rangements, the PUC shall establish and
enforce the rates, terms, and conditions for
pole attachments and rearrangements so
as to assure a public utility the recovery of
specified funds. As amended July 5, this
bill states the intent of the legislature that
public utilities and publicly owned utili-
ties be fairly and adequately compensated
for the use of their rights-of-way and
easements for the installation of fiber optic
cable, and that electric public utilities and
publicly owned utilities have the ability, if
they so desire, to negotiate access to those
fiber optic cables, for their own use, and
makes findings and declarations in that
regard. This bill was signed by the Gover-
nor on September 17 (Chapter 623, Stat-
utes of 1994).
AB 3610 (Moore). Existing law re-
quires the PUC to design and implement
programs whereby each telephone corpo-
ration shall provide a telecommunications
device capable of servicing the needs of
individuals who are deaf or hearing im-
paired, and to establish a rate recovery
mechanism through a surcharge to be in
effect until January 1, 1995. As introduced
February 25, this bill extends that sur-
charge until January 1, 1997. This bill was
signed by the Governor on September 15
(Chapter 608, Statutes of 1994).
AB 727 (Moore). Existing law re-
quires the PUC, in granting an operating
permit or a certificate to a charter-party
carrier, to require the carrier to maintain
adequate liability insurance. As amended
April 14, this bill prohibits any agency or
local government from requiring any per-
son, firm, or corporation holding a valid
permit as a charter-party carrier to provide
insurance in a manner different from that
required by the Commission.
This bill prohibits the governing body
of an airport from imposing a fee based on
gross receipts of charter-party carriers op-
erating limousines. This bill prohibits a
charter-party carrier from operating a lim-
ousine, as defined, unless the limousine is
equipped with special license plates is-
sued and distributed by the Department of
Motor Vehicles (DMV), and requires the
PUC to issue a permit or certificate for
limousine service. This bill requires a
charter-party carrier operating a limousine
to state the number of its permit or license
plate in every written or oral advertise-
ment. These provisions become operative
on July 1, 1995.
Existing law makes it unlawful for the
owner of a charter-party carrier of passen-
ger motor vehicles employing or other-
wise directing the driver of the vehicle to
permit operation of the vehicle upon a
public highway for compensation without
first complying with vehicle identification
requirements under a specified provision
of law. This bill, in addition, makes it
unlawful to permit the operation of any
such vehicle without having complied
with specified provisions requiring the
display of a decal or special license plates.
This provision will become operative on
July 1, 1995.
This bill requires every limousine op-
erated by a charter-party carrier to display
a special identification license plate issued
by the DMV. This provision will become
operative on July 1, 1995.
This bill requires the PUC to fund the
costs of administering the special identifi-
cation license plate program required by
this bill, including the costs of the DMV,
from the Public Utilities Commission
Transportation Reimbursement Account.
This bill requires the DMV and the
PUC to adopt a memorandum of under-
standing by January I, 1995, governing
the exchange of information on vehicle
registrations and reimbursement by the
Commission of the DMV's costs in pro-
ducing and distributing special identifica-
tion license plates for limousines as re-
quired by this bill. This bill was signed by
the Governor on June 24 (Chapter 109,
Statutes of 1994).
The following is a status update on
bills reported in detail in CRLR Vol. 14,
Nos. 2 & 3 (Spring/Summer 1994) at pages
219-22:
AB 2840 (Solis). Existing law states
that the PUC's meetings shall be open and
public and sets forth certain requirements
in that regard. As amended August 26, this
bill would have additionally required the
PUC to schedule public participation
meetings for hearing public opinion on
various public utilities' rates or services.
This bill was vetoed by Governor Wilson
on September 27; according to Wilson,
"this bill proposes to micromanage the
operations of the [PUC] by mandating the
method it must use to elicit the concerns
of utility ratepayers. The bill's require-
ment that the Commission conduct as
many as 20 meetings around the State each
year, in addition to its other public meet-
ings, constitutes overreaching."
AB 2850 (Escutia). Existing law re-
quires the PUC, upon scheduling hearings
and specifying the scope of issues to be
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heard in any proceeding involving an elec-
trical, gas, telephone, railroad, or water
corporation, or a highway carrier, to as-
sign an ALJ to preside over the hearings,
either sitting alone or assisting the Com-
missioner or Commissioners who will
hear the case. Existing law permits the
PUC, in issuing its decision, to adopt,
modify, or set aside the proposed decision
of the ALJ or any part of that decision.
Every finding, opinion, and order made in
the proposed decision and approved or
confirmed by the Commission shall, upon
that approval or confirmation, be the find-
ing, opinion, and order of the Commis-
sion. As amended August 22, this bill re-
quires, with a specified exception, begin-
ning January 1, 1995, any item appearing
on the PUC's public agenda as an alternate
item, as defined, to an ALJ's proposed
decision to be served upon all parties to
the proceeding and be subject to public
review and comment before it may be
voted upon. The bill also requires that,
prior to commencement of any meeting at
which Commissioners vote on items on
the public agenda, the PUC make avail-
able to the public copies of the agenda and,
upon request, any agenda item documents
that are proposed to be considered at a
Commission meeting. This bill was signed
by the Governor on September 28 (Chap-
ter 1110, Statutes of 1994).
SB 1957 (Rosenthal). Existing law
states that the PUC's meetings shall be
open and public in accordance with the
Bagley-Keene Open Meeting Act; with
respect to the PUC, that Act provides that
the requirement that the public be pro-
vided an opportunity to address the Com-
mission on each agenda item does not
apply to agenda items that involve deci-
sions of the Commission regarding adju-
dicatory hearings. As amended June 27,
this bill would have deleted that exemp-
tion, prohibited serial, rotating, or seriatim
meetings, and defined the term "meeting."
This bill also would have prohibited cer-
tain ex parte communications regarding
proceedings conducted by the Commis-
sion; required that, prior to commence-
ment of any meeting at which Commis-
sioners vote on items on the public
agenda, the PUC make available to the
public copies of the agenda and any other
writings distributed to all or a majority of
the Commissioners for discussion or con-
sideration at the meeting, and prohibited
the PUC from voting on certain alternate
public agenda items to proposed decisions
of ALJs until those items and a summary
of the substantive changes proposed in the
proposed decision of the ALJ by those
items, have been made available to the
public.
Provisions from three other bills-SB
1956 (Rosenthal) (subjecting any non-so-
cial gathering of a quorum of PUC mem-
bers to the requirements of the Bagley-
Keene Open Meeting Law), AB 2840
(Solis) (requiring the PUC to schedule
public participation hearings in the service
territory of every utility under its jurisdic-
tion), and AB 2850 (Escutia) (requiring
various documents related to public hear-
ings to be furnished to the public before
the meeting or voting)-were amended
into this bill late in the legislative session.
This bill was vetoed by Governor Wilson
on July 20; according to Wilson, "[tihis
measure is poorly conceived, and superfi-
cially addresses the serious procedural re-
form issues confronting the Commission,
and unnecessarily burdens the decision-
making process with unworkable man-
dates while ignoring the far-reaching pro-
cedural and structural reform recommen-
dations made by the Advisory Working
Group" chaired by former PUC President
Don Vial. [14:2&3 CRLR 3, 214]
AB 3720 (Costa), SB 1966 (Calde-
ron), and AB 3606 (Moore) implement
some of the Commission's recommenda-
tions made in Enhancing California's
Competitive Strength: A Strategy for Tele-
communications Infrastructure, the PUC's
December 1993 report to the Governor in
which it proposed sweeping changes in
the state regulatory structure of the tele-
communications industry, including a call
for open competition in all telecommuni-
cations markets by January I, 1997. [14:1
CRLR 168-69]
- AB 3720 (Costa), as amended July 7,
requires the PUC to require competitive
intrastate interexchange telecommunica-
tions service, subject to specified condi-
tions. The bill also requires the PUC to
pursue all reasonable and necessary legis-
lative and judicial actions to open Cali-
fornia's intrastate interexchange markets
to full competition. These provisions will
be known as the California Long Distance
Telecommunications Consumer Choice
Act. This bill was signed by the Governor
on September 27 (Chapter 934, Statutes of
1994).
- SB 1966 (Calderon). The Public
Utilities Act sets forth the findings and
declarations of the legislature that a policy
for telecommunications in California is,
among other things, to promote economic
growth, job creation, and the substantial
social benefits that will result from the
rapid implementation of advanced infor-
mation and communications technologies
by assuring adequate long-term invest-
ment in the necessary infrastructure. As
amended August I1, this bill instead refers
to the rapid implementation of these tech-
nologies by adequate long-term invest-
ment in the necessary infrastructure. The
bill also declares that it is a policy of the
state to remove the barriers to open and
competitive markets and promote fair
product and price competition in a way
that encourages greater efficiency, lower
prices, and more consumer choice. This
bill was signed by the Governor on Sep-
tember 30 (Chapter 1284, Statutes of
1994).
- AB 3606 (Moore), as amended Au-
gust 17, makes a legislative finding and
declaration that a policy for telecommuni-
cations in California is to promote lower
prices, broader consumer choice, and
avoidance of anticompetitive conduct;
states the legislature's intent that all tele-
communications markets subject to PUC
jurisdiction be opened to competition not
later than January 1, 1997, and that the
PUC take steps to ensure that competition
in telecommunications markets is fair and
that the state's universal service policy is
observed; provides that if any local ex-
change telephone company obtains the
right to offer cable television or video
dialtone service within its service territory
from a regulatory body or court of compe-
tent jurisdiction, any cable television cor-
poration may immediately have the right
to enter into the local telecommunications
market within the service territory of that
local exchange carrier by filing for ap-
proval a certificate of public convenience
and necessity, if necessary, which shall be
expeditiously reviewed by the PUC; and
requires the Commission to expedite its
open network architecture and network
development, interconnection, and other
related dockets so that whatever addi-
tional rules and regulations that may be
necessary to achieve fair local exchange
competition shall be in place no later than
January 1, 1997. This bill was signed by
the Governor on September 30 (Chapter
1260, Statutes of 1994).
SB 1304 (Ayala). Existing law re-
quires electrical corporations to make
available to qualifying heavy industrial
customers optional interruptible or curtail-
able service, at a rate to reflect a pricing
incentive. As amended May 10, this bill
requires the PUC to direct each public
utility electrical corporation to renew its
efforts to reduce the rates charged heavy
industrial customers to a level competitive
with other states, and requires each elec-
trical corporation to report to the PUC no
later than June 30, 1995, on those mea-
sures or practices it has identified that
would permit it to reduce its firm service
rates for heavy industrial customers to the
level of its interruptible or curtailable ser-
vice rates provided to those customers as
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of January 30, 1993. This bill also ex-
presses legislative findings and declara-
tions and state the legislative intent with
respect to these provisions. This bill was
signed by the Governor on September 22
(Chapter 752, Statutes of 1994).
SB 1456 (Rosenthal), as amended
June 23, requires the PUC to authorize
public utilities to establish catastrophic
event memorandum accounts and to re-
cord in those accounts specified costs that
would be recoverable in rates following a
request by the affected utility, a finding of
their reasonableness, and approval by the
Commission. The bill also requires the
PUC to hold expedited proceedings in re-
sponse to utility applications to recover
costs associated with catastrophic events.
This bill was signed by the Governor on
September 29 (Chapter 1156, Statutes of
1994).
AB 2837 (Baca), as introduced Febru-
ary 14, would have prohibited the PUC
from ordering an electrical or gas corpo-
ration to put low-income energy services
out for bid, and rescinded any such orders
made prior to January 1, 1995. This bill
was vetoed by Governor Wilson on July
20; Wilson opined that "[i]t would be wholly
inappropriate to enact a statute which limits
the ability to protect ratepayers' from non-
competitively derived costs."
AB 3704 (Bronshvag). Existing law
prescribes the circumstances under which
telephone corporations can release infor-
mation regarding residential subscribers
without their consent in writing. As amended
April 11, this bill permits release of infor-
mation relating to Universal Lifeline Tele-
phone Service customers to public utilities
for the sole purpose of low-income rate-
payer assistance outreach efforts. This bill
was signed by the Governor on July 15
(Chapter 214, Statutes of 1994).
AB 3643 (Polanco), as amended May
2, requires the PUC to initiate an investi-
gation and open a proceeding to examine
the current and future definitions of uni-
versal service in telecommunications; and
requires the PUC to report to the legisla-
ture by January 1, 1996, on its findings and
recommendations. This bill was signed by
the Governor on July 20 (Chapter 278,
Statutes of 1994).
SB 1939 (Rosenthal), as amended Au-
gust 25, requires the PUC to extend spe-
cial programs for up to a three-year period
to encourage telecommuting in the area of
the state affected by the Northridge earth-
quake of 1994. The bill requires the PUC
to initiate an investigation into the estab-
lishment of special telecommunications
programs to encourage telecommuting in
the entire state, and report to the legisla-
ture its findings and recommendations by
December 1, 1995. This bill was signed by
the Governor on September 27 (Chapter
943, Statutes of 1994).
SB 1998 (Kopp), as amended July 2,
requires the PUC to investigate the advan-
tages and disadvantages of requiring tele-
phone corporations to bill in increments
shorter than one minute and report to the
legislature not later than December 31,
1995. This bill was signed by the Gover-
nor on September 19 (Chapter 677, Stat-
utes of 1994).
SB 1960 (Rosenthal), as amended Au-
gust 26, this bill would have, until January
1, 2010, enacted the Rosenthal-Moore Ed-
ucational Technology Act of 1994, and
established the Golden State Education
Network Foundation, with specified mem-
bership. This bill would have made an
appropriation of $40 million from any
moneys received by the PUC pursuant to
a specified decision of the Commission
for purposes of the Rosenthal-Moore Ed-
ucational Technology Act of 1994. This
bill was vetoed by the Governor on Sep-
tember 30.
AB 1879 (Bornstein) and AB 1879
(Peace). Existing law requires the PUC to
designate a baseline quantity of electricity
and gas, as defined, necessary for a signif-
icant portion of the reasonable energy
needs of the average residential customer.
The Commission is also required to estab-
lish a standard limited allowance of gas
and electricity to which specified residen-
tial customers are entitled in addition to
the baseline quantity. As amended August
25, these bills would have included within
the category of residential customers to
whom the additional limited allowance of
electricity applies, until December 31,
1997, customers 62 years of age or older
who reside in extreme climatic zones, as
defined; prohibited the cost of this limited
additional allowance from being borne
solely by any single class of customer; and
established a different baseline quantity of
electricity for those customers. Both bills
were vetoed by the Governor on Septem-
ber 24.
AB 3524 (Bowler). Under existing
law, the furnishing of specified passenger
transportation services by a charter-party
carrier of passengers is subject to the
PUC's jurisdiction and control. These ser-
vices are required to be furnished pursuant
to a certificate of public convenience and
necessity or a permit issued by the Com-
mission, subject to specified filing fees.
Existing law limits these permits to ser-
vice areas with mileage restrictions. As
amended June 23, this bill alters these
mileage restrictions for designated per-
mits, and revises the amount of filing fees
for a specified classification.
Existing law sets forth the require-
ments to be met before a permit or certif-
icate may be issued for charter-party car-
riers of passengers. This bill makes these
provisions applicable to the issuance or
renewal of permits, and sets forth certain
requirements to be met before a certificate
may be issued or renewed. This bill was
signed by the Governor on September 9
(Chapter 456, Statutes of 1994).
AB 3589 (Rainey), as amended Au-
gust 8, specifically requires the PUC to
establish just, reasonable, and nondis-
criminatory minimum rates for dump
truck carriers and adjust the rates of those
carriers to reflect costs that have increased
or decreased since the rates were last ad-
justed; requires the PUC to establish or
approve expedited rate deviation proce-
dures for dump truck carriers; and autho-
rizes the PUC to approve applications by
dump truck carriers for deviations from
those minimum rates. This bill became
law without the Governor's signature on
October 4 (Chapter 1299, Statutes of
1994).
AB 3332 (Conroy). Existing law pro-
vides that when the PUC's executive di-
rector determines that any household
goods carrier, passenger stage corpora-
tion, highway common carrier or cement
carrier, or highway carrier, or any officer,
director, or agent of any household goods
carrier, passenger stage corporation, high-
way common carrier, or cement carrier, or
highway carrier, is failing or omitting or
about to fail or omit to do anything re-
quired of it by law, or by any order, deci-
sion, rule, direction, or requirement of the
Commission, or is doing anything or
about to do anything, or permitting any-
thing or about to permit anything to be
done, in violation of law or of any order,
decision, role, direction, or requirement of
the commission, the executive director
may make application to the superior
court for injunctive relief, a restraining
order, or other order, upon a showing by
the executive director that a person or
corporation has engaged in or is about to
engage in these acts or practices. As
amended June 28, this bill specifically
includes within the type of order that the
court may grant an order allowing vehi-
cles used for subsequent operations sub-
ject to the order to be impounded at the
carrier's expense and subject to release
only by subsequent court order following
a petition to the court by the defendant or
owner of the vehicle. This bill was signed
by the Governor on September 9 (Chapter
457, Statutes of 1994).
AB 2333 (Morrow), as amended March
3, requires telephone, gas, and electric
utilities to provide district attorney inspec-
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tors and investigators with limited cus-
tomer information under specified condi-
tions with respect to investigations relat-
ing to missing or abducted children. The
bill requires inspectors and investigators
requesting this information to prepare and
sign a written affidavit supporting the re-
quest, and provides that specified persons
and entities shall not be subject to criminal
or civil liability for reasonably relying on
an affidavit pursuant to this provision.
This bill was signed by the Governor on
June 24 (Chapter 112, Statutes of 1994).
AB 766 (Hauser), as amended April
21, requires the PUC to undertake a pro-
pane safety inspection and enforcement
program for propane distribution systems
to ensure compliance with the federal
pipeline standards by propane operators
within the state, and permits the PUC to
adopt rules, at least as stringent as the
federal law, in order to protect the health
and safety of customers served by propane
distribution systems. This bill requires the
State Board of Equalization and the PUC
to establish a uniform billing surcharge
designed to cover the cost of implement-
ing these provisions. This bill was signed
by the Governor on August 31 (Chapter
388, Statutes of 1994).
AB 860 (Pringle), as amended July 4,
SB 141 (Alquist), as amended July 9, and
AB 2028 (Statham), as amended July 1,
are no longer relevant to the PUC.
The following bills died in committee:
SB 1325 (Kopp), which would have ex-
pressed legislative intent to eliminate the
original review jurisdiction of the Califor-
nia Supreme Court over PUC decisions
and authorize judicial review of PUC pro-
ceedings in either the Supreme Court or a
court of appeal; SB 1956 (Rosenthal),
which would have subjected PUC agenda
items regarding adjudicatory hearings to
the Bagley-Keene Open Meeting Act, and
prohibited serial, rotating, or seriatim meet-
ings; AB 2737 (Cannella), which would
have required public utilities to provide to
peace officers and to federal investigators
and law enforcement officers with names,
prior addresses, places of employment,
and dates of service of utility customers
under specified conditions; AB 3767
(Andal), which would have authorized the
PUC to determine that some or all non-
dominant telephone corporations shall be
subject to registration-only regulation,
subject to specified conditions, and set
forth the duties and authority of the PUC
in regulating these corporations (see
MAJOR PROJECTS); SB 1962 (Rosen-
thal), which would have required the PUC
to maintain a telecommunications educa-
tion program similar to its existing Tele-
communications Education Trust (TET)
to protect the interests of California con-
sumers; ACR 131 (Escutia), which would
have requested the PUC to conduct a study
on at-grade railroad crossings from the
Ports of Long Beach and Los Angeles to
downtown Los Angeles; AB 3452 (Mount-
joy), which would have required the PUC
to establish onlyjust, reasonable, and non-
discriminatory rates for dump truck carri-
ers; SB 320 (Rosenthal), which would
have permitted the PUC to expand the
funding base of the Universal Lifeline
Telephone Service program surcharge;
AB 1386 (Moore), which would have-
among other things-required the PUC to
cause a gas corporation to publish a tariff
establishing terms and conditions of
wholesale gas service for a municipality
within its service territory (including
rates); SB 662 (Bergeson), which would
have required the PUC, in consultation
with specified departments and represen-
tatives, to prepare and adopt a program for
telecommunications services for disabled
persons for motorist aid in the event of a
freeway emergency; AB 2363 (Moore),
which would have permitted gas, heat, or
electrical corporations and their subsidiar-
ies that are regulated as public utilities by
the PUC to conduct specified work if the
work is incidental to another utility func-
tion and is performed by a utility em-
ployee who is present on the premises for
the other function; and AB 173 (V. Brown),
which would have limited the amount of
salary paid to the President and each mem-
ber of the PUC to an amount no greater
than the annual salary of members of the
legislature.
U FUTURE MEETINGS
The full Commission usually meets














T he State Bar of California was created
by legislative act in 1927 and codified
in the California Constitution at Article
V1, section 9. The State Bar was estab-
lished as a public corporation within the
judicial branch of government, and mem-
bership is a requirement for all attorneys
practicing law in California. Today, the
State Bar has over 141,000 members,
which equals approximately 17% of the
nation's population of lawyers.
The State Bar Act, Business and Pro-
fessions Code section 6000 et seq., desig-
nates a Board of Governors to run the State
Bar. The Board President is elected by the
Board of Governors at its June meeting
and serves a one-year term beginning in
September. Only governors who have
served on the Board for three years are
eligible to run for President.
The Board consists of 23 members-
seventeen licensed attorneys and six non-
lawyer public members. Of the attorneys,
sixteen of them-including the Presi-
dent-are elected to the Board by lawyers
in nine geographic districts. A representa-
tive of the California Young Lawyers As-
sociation (CYLA), appointed by that
organization's Board of Directors, also
sits on the Board. The six public members
are variously selected by the Governor,
Assembly Speaker, and Senate Rules
Committee, and confirmed by the state
Senate. Each Board member serves a
three-year term, except for the CYLA rep-
resentative (who serves for one year) and
the Board President (who serves a fourth
year when elected to the presidency). The
terms are staggered to provide for the se-
lection of five attorneys and two public
members each year.
The State Bar includes twenty standing
committees; fourteen special committees,
addressing specific issues; sixteen sec-
tions covering fourteen substantive areas
of law; Bar service programs; and the
Conference of Delegates, which gives a
representative voice to 291 local, ethnic,
and specialty bar associations statewide.
The State Bar and its subdivisions per-
form a myriad of functions which fall into
six major categories: ( I ) testing State Bar
applicants and accrediting law schools;
(2) enforcing the State Bar Act and the
Bar's Rules of Professional Conduct,
which are codified at section 6076 of the
Business and Professions Code, and pro-
moting competence-based education; (3)
ensuring the delivery of and access to legal
services; (4) educating the public; (5) im-
proving the administration of justice; and
(6) providing member services.
Almost 75% of the Bar's annual $56
million budget is spent on its new attorney
discipline system. The system includes the
first full-time professional court for attor-
ney discipline in the nation and a large
staff of investigators and prosecutors. The
Bar recommends sanctions to the Califor-
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